



This article considers new challenges that potentially confront 
designers of contract-law syllabi in Australia, particularly in 
relation to assisting formative learners of the law to organize their 
conceptual knowledge of various factors or events that might work 
to ‘vitiate’ a contractual relationship apparently formed at law. 
Having recently prepared a new contract-law subject incorporating 
‘vitiating factors’ within its purview, the authors describe the 
approach that they took to the design and presentation of that 
particular component of the course. Many, if not most, of the factors 
were presented as responding to particular (and quite familiar) 
forms of pre-contractual bargaining behaviour that subject an 
otherwise rational jural agent to an improper reason for intentional 
entry into a lawful contract. None of the vitiating factors, the authors 
decided, could be adequately explained in terms of single-party 
‘defective consent’ alone. But no sooner had the new course been 
delivered than the High Court released its decision in Thorne v 
Kennedy. The majority of the judgments in that case immediately 
rendered descriptively inadequate at least part of the conceptual 
account that the authors had built for their learners in the subject. 
This article describes how that occurred and what ramifications 
might follow for the design and delivery of contract-law courses in 
Australia in the future, at least in relation to so-called ‘vitiating 
factors’. 
I  Introduction 
Every teacher of contract law must, at some juncture in the syllabus, after 
dealing with the principles by which legal contractual status is effectively 
assumed by parties who objectively intend as much — offer and acceptance, 
certainty and completeness, consideration, intention to be bound, and the 
like — introduce the learner to various reasons that the law recognizes as 
sufficient to dispense from the normal legal consequences of the 
assumption of obligation that has, at least in most cases, already formally 
occurred between the parties involved. Such reasons are variously dubbed: 
‘vitiating factors’, ‘excuses’, ‘exculpatory factors’, ‘invalidating 
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 circumstances (or conditions)’, ‘pleas in avoidance’, ‘defences’, ‘unjust 
factors’, and the like.1 
Recently, at the University of Queensland, we have had both 
opportunity and reason to reflect on how best to organize the conceptual 
knowledge of our formative learners in contract law, including in relation 
to the place of so-called ‘vitiating factors’ within the province of that 
subject. This has been part and parcel of a general overhaul of the law 
curriculum in our School, as we began, in 2017, to migrate away from a 
traditional ‘lecture–tutorial’ mode of legal education to a more intensive, 
small-group, ‘seminar’ style of delivery, whereby students are both 
encouraged and enabled to participate more actively in the learning process 
than was possible under the previous model. 
Thankfully, at our University, we are also afforded the educational 
luxury of being able to teach contract law non-superficially to students 
across two successive semesters. The initial course, taught in the very first 
semester of the student’s legal education, is titled ‘Principles of Contractual 
Agreement’. It deals with the means by which jural agents effectively 
assume legal contractual commitments toward each other (and perhaps 
subsequently modify those commitments by cognate means), before 
turning to the question of the content and extent of those commitments so 
assumed (or modified). In other words, the first course introduces the 
learner to the principles of contract formation, as well as the law governing 
the identification, interpretation and, nowadays, ‘regulation’ (statutory 
control) of those rights and obligations that resulted from the process of 
formation and which constitute the contract’s ‘terms’ or ‘content’. 
In the following semester, students enrol in a compulsory sequel course, 
‘Principles of Contractual Liability’, which simply picks up, in a purely 
linear fashion, from where the Principles of Contractual Agreement course 
left off. The second course assumes that contract formation has 
successfully occurred (and also that no problems exit in relation to 
identifying and interpreting the terms, more or less), and it proceeds to 
examine the ‘liability’ side of the contractual relationship. We begin by 
considering the concepts of performance and breach, as well as the various 
ways in which (or reasons for which) a valid contractual relationship might 
be ‘discharged’, that is, ended in futuro. Assuming a liability event such as 
an unexcused breach or an accepted repudiation, we then turn to examine 
the concept of enforcement (ie, remedies such as damages, debt and 
specific performance), before finally introducing students to what is the 
opposite of enforcement: relief. This brings us to the topic of ‘vitiation’, 
whereby a formally valid contract might subsequently be disavowed and f 
for some reason that the law, equity or statute recognizes as sufficient to 
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 have rendered the transaction defeasible, typically at the election of the 
party adversely affected by the reason. Most of the reasons for this sort of 
relief appear, at least at first blush, to concern various ‘defects’ in the 
‘consent’ that was brought to the impugned transaction by the relief-
seeking party. This makes sense in the context of a facilitative institution 
— contract — that exists to give normative force to a voluntary or 
consensual relationship of exchange that the parties outwardly intend to 
have legal effect. But there are always two parties (at least) to such a 
‘consensual’ jural relationship, and a legal order that gave special weight 
to the consent of one contracting party only would be a potentially unjust 
legal order — of which more later. 
Difficult choices confront the law teacher when it comes to assisting his 
or her learners to make sense of the universe of reasons that the law 
recognizes as sufficient to dispense from legal contractual obligation that 
parties have already objectively assumed. This is hardly assisted by the 
non-uniform treatment of ‘contract vitiation’ in leading textbooks in the 
field, which we suspect may well be mirrored in the treatment that the topic 
receives in the classrooms of law schools around Australia as well. Taking 
some of those textbooks as evidence of possible ways of approaching the 
teaching of contract vitiation to early-stage law students (Part II below), 
we discuss (in Part III) some of the ‘discrimina’ that the subject designer 
might want to bear in mind when contemplating how best to order and 
present the subject matter of contract vitiation within the contract-law 
syllabus more widely (if indeed contract is the course within which that 
subject matter happens to be taught2). In Part IV, we describe our own 
approach to the teaching of vitiation within our Principles of Contractual 
Liability course. Most importantly (in our view), that approach is one that 
attempts to achieve consistency between the law’s treatment of contract 
vitiation and the intellectual, justificatory and institutional forms of order 
that are presupposed by the classical ‘liberal’ conception of contract, which 
is the context of that treatment (certain statutory modifications aside). In a 
nutshell, and assuming contractual capacity, that conception constrains us 
(for the most part) to conceive of contract vitiation not simply in terms of 
deficiencies in personal consent simpliciter, but rather as a dual-sided 
‘corrective justice’ relationship between two legal agents of full age, where 
the contractual ‘consent’ on both sides is equally engaged whenever the 
law is deciding whether to disappoint the contractual expectations of one 
contracting party in order to respect (by restoring) the contractual 
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 autonomy of the other contracting party. Although this approach to the 
topic has been put under stress by High Court’s recent decision in Thorne 
v Kennedy (‘Thorne’)3 (Part V), we ultimately conclude (in Part IV) that 
this, on its own, does not suffice to unravel our prior decisions concerning 
course design. On the contrary, it provides us with a ‘teachable moment’: 
an opportunity to agitate our early-stage law students into the engaging in 
the cognitive skill of reflecting critically on the current state of the law and 
articulating educated opinions about it. 
II  How is Contract Vitiation Currently Taught in  
Australian Law Schools? 
The short answer to this question is that we (the authors) do not know for 
sure. We suspect that the treatment of exculpatory reasons by those 
entrusted with facilitating the learning of the modern student of contract 
law in Australia varies from law school to law school, according to the 
personal predilections or inspired judgements of curriculum committees, 
or of the individual teaching staff involved, either currently or historically,4 
but we are not actually in possession of the detailed syllabi of contract-law 
courses from around the country, at least as they currently stand.5 Our 
suspicion, rather, is founded on a proxy for such syllabi, namely, a selection 
of respected textbooks on the law of contract. Granted, this is not a 
particularly scientific survey or process,6 but a number of those works are 
likely to feature as prescribed or recommended reading for students 
enrolled in university-degree programs for law in Australia. They are also 
likely to influence both teacher and student in relation to the subject as a 
whole, not to mention, of course, that some of them would have been 
written (or edited) by the teacher or teachers of the actual course(s) in 
which the relevant text is prescribed or recommended. 
Opening the pages of the aforementioned texts, one notices 
immediately the considerable (but certainly not complete) uniformity in 
approach and sequencing of topics among authors when it comes to 
elucidating the principles of contract formation. It is otherwise, however, 
when one turns to the question of the vitiation of contractual obligation. 
There, the uniformity of treatment diminishes considerably. By way of 
example, the editors of Chitty7 deal with significant exculpatory doctrines 
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 in Part 2 of Volume 1 of that work (‘General Principles’), Part 2 being 
dedicated to ‘Formation of Contract’. So, for example, Chapter 6 deals with 
common mistake, Chapter 7 with misrepresentation, and Chapter 8 with 
duress, undue influence and unconscionable bargaining (including 
inequality of bargaining power). What is unique (and perhaps unusual) 
about this treatment is that, while the factual phenomena that attract each 
of the doctrines mentioned usually occur prior to the parties reaching 
contractual agreement, legally speaking none of those phenomena (other 
than certain kinds of fundamental mistake) actually affects the formation 
of the impugned contract at all. Without explanation, the decision to deal, 
inside that part of the work, with exculpatory doctrines that do not affect 
the source of contractual obligation is perhaps a puzzling one. 
All the other texts that we reviewed, and which are written or edited by 
United Kingdom-based authors, deal with the subject matter of exculpation 
from contractual obligation separately from the formation principles. 
Furmston,8 for example, provides a standalone chapter on mistake (Chapter 
8), and then one that gathers together the independent doctrines of 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence (Chapter 9), which he 
introduces as ‘three reasons why a contract may be invalid’.9 Treitel10 
simply presents separate chapters on mistake (Chapter 8), 
misrepresentation (Chapter 9), and duress, undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains (Chapter 10). Anson 11  arranges exculpatory 
reasons around a grouping of ‘factors tending to defeat contractual liability’ 
(Part 3), each such ‘factor’ then comprising the subject matter of a chapter 
dedicated to that grouping: incapacity (Chapter 7); mistake (Chapter 8); 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure (Chapter 9); duress, undue influence 
and unconscionable bargains (Chapter 10); and illegality (Chapter 11). 
Closer to home, the Australian contract textbook writers that we 
surveyed likewise deal with the exculpatory doctrines of law and equity (as 
they affect contracts) independently of the principles of contract formation. 
Greig and Davis, 12  for example, offer separate chapters on each of 
misrepresentation (Chapter 14), mistake (Chapter 15) and ‘abuse of a 
dominant position’ (Chapter 16), the latter rubricizing such doctrines as 
duress, undue influence and unconscionable contracts. John Carter’s text 
on Contract Law in Australia (currently in its sixth edition),13 contains a 
part (Part V) on ‘vitiating factors’, itself comprising individual chapters on 
contracts induced by misleading conduct (under both the general law and 
statute: Chapters 18 and 19, respectively)), contractual mistake (Chapter 
20), duress (Chapter 22), undue influence (Chapter 23), and 
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 unconscionable conduct and unfair terms (Chapter 24). Paterson, 
Robertson and Duke14 dedicate a part (Part XI) of their principally student-
oriented text to ‘vitiating factors’, but they then arrange those factors 
around various taxonomical subcategories of ‘misinformation’ (enclosing 
the doctrines of mistake (Chapter 31) and misrepresentation (Chapter 32), 
and the statutory law relating to misleading or deceptive conduct (Chapter 
33)), ‘abuse of power’ (gathering together the principles governing relief 
for duress (Chapter 34), undue influence (Chapter 35), unconscionable 
dealing (Chapter 36), third-party impropriety (Chapter 37), and 
unconscionable and unjust conduct under statute (Chapter 38)). The 
Australian edition of Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract15 contains a part 
(Part IV) on ‘excuses’, which houses standalone chapters on each of 
misrepresentation and misleading conduct (Chapter 11), mistake (Chapter 
12), duress (Chapter 13), undue influence (Chapter 14), unconscionable 
conduct (Chapter 15), incapacity (Chapter 17), and illegal contracts 
(Chapter 18). 
Across the ditch in New Zealand, the leading text on the law of contract 
by Burrows, Finn and Todd is currently in its fifth edition.16  Previous 
editions of that work simply presented a series of discrete chapters on each 
of mistake (Chapter 10), misrepresentation (Chapter 11), duress, undue 
influence and unconscionable bargains (Chapter 12), illegality (Chapter 
13), and contractual capacity (Chapter 14). In the fifth edition, however, 
Chapter 12 has been retitled ‘Exploitation’, and the authors explain in the 
opening paragraph of that chapter that the subject matter that follows is, 
broadly speaking, about ‘the attempted exploitation of one contracting 
party by the other’, which is a problem that ‘[t]he courts have been familiar 
with … for a long time’, and that they (the courts) ‘have developed three 
particular doctrines to deal with it’,17 namely, duress, undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains. 
Turning briefly to North America, the Canadian offerings that we 
surveyed also deal with exculpation from legal contractual obligation 
separately from the creation of such obligation. The sixth edition of the late 
Gerald Fridman’s text, The Law of Contract in Canada,18 simply presents 
separate chapters on such doctrines as mistake (Chapter 7), 
misrepresentation (Chapter 8), and duress, undue influence and 
unconscionability (Chapter 9). They are not, for example, arranged into a 
separate part or segment of the work according to some connective theme. 
John McCamus’s text on The Law of Contracts,19 in contrast, contains a 
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 distinct part (Part Three) on ‘vitiating factors’, comprising a miscellany of 
legal and equitable exculpatory events: misrepresentation (Chapter 10), 
duress, undue influence and unconscionability (Chapter 11), illegality 
(Chapter 12), mistake (Chapter 13), and frustration (Chapter 14). The 
somewhat idiosyncratic and enigmatically structured text on Canadian 
Contract Law by Angela Swan and Jakub Adamski20 assigns discussion of 
the law of misrepresentation and mistake to a chapter dealing with 
‘interpretation and risk allocation’ (Chapter 8), while doctrines such as 
capacity, unconscionability and undue influence are gathered together in a 
chapter on ‘the control of contract power’ (Chapter 9). Duress is treated 
only in connection with so-called ‘going-transaction adjustments’ (contract 
modifications) inside a chapter dealing with the question of which 
promises the law will enforce (Chapter 2). And south of the Canadian 
border, the late Allan Farnsworth’s masterly work on Contracts21 contains 
a part (Part II) on the ‘enforceability of promises’, within which there are 
separate chapters on ‘The Bargaining Process: Offer and Acceptance’ 
(Chapter 3) and ‘Policing the Agreement’ (Chapter 4). Inside the latter 
chapter discussion is found on such matters as personal incapacity (part B), 
behaviour (or ‘abuse of the bargaining process’ (part C)), which includes 
treatment of American law (at that time) relating to misrepresentation, 
duress and undue influence. There is also a part E dealing with 
‘contemporary controls’ such as unconscionability and consumer 
legislation. The law of contractual mistake is parsed later in the work, in a 
chapter on ‘Failure of a Basic Assumption: Mistake, Impracticability and 
Frustration’ (Chapter 9). Also, the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts22 — which, while not a textbook, presumably has an 
influence on the teaching and development of contract-law syllabi — has 
separate chapters discussing mistake (Chapter 6) and misrepresentation, 
duress and undue influence (Chapter 7). Those chapters are not arranged 
into a separate part of the text. The chapter on misrepresentation, duress 
and undue influence introduces all three as factors that impair ‘the integrity 
of the bargaining process’.23 
The diversity in approach to the organization and presentation of 
‘vitiating factors’ in the abovementioned texts itself presents a challenge 
for subject designers, particularly for someone who is new to the teaching 
of contract law and wanting to create a meaningful learning experience for 
those who are the intended beneficiaries of the exercise. Presumably those 
who write the textbooks have reasons for organizing the relevant subject 
matter as they do, but we are struck by how few authors bother to explain 
the anatomy or structure of their overall work. We suspect that it might be 
the same for teachers of contract law in relation to the courses they present 
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 to students, at least in relation to the various factors or events that function 
to dispense from legal contract obligation in some way. We say ‘in some 
way’ because there is no reason to think that all exculpatory reasons in 
contract law function in the same manner and for the same reason, even 
though the ‘explainer’ of the reasons may have assembled them under a 
single tag or theme, such as ‘vitiation’. Lumping all such reasons together 
with no (or inadequate) explanation as to their (inter)relationship, if any, 
strikes us as a deficient way to support student comprehension of the 
subject matter as a whole. In our view, there are a number of informing 
distinctions that should be drawn at the outset of the subject-design 
exercise in relation to contract vitiation. We turn to these now. 
III  Contract Vitiation: Some Preliminary Vital Discrimina 
To the extent that ‘contract vitiation’ is still legitimately taught inside a 
contract-law syllabus in Australia (and not, say, via a more generic 
‘obligations’-style undergraduate subject), our first challenge as the 
designers and deliverers of the second of the contract-law offerings at our 
institution lay in deciding what, exactly, belonged to the realm of ‘contract 
vitiation’ and what did not. We found this to be a slightly tricky inquiry, 
not least because of the diversity of considerations needing to be weighed 
in the assessment. First, we had to be confident in our own minds as to 
what, exactly, was denoted by ‘contract vitiation’. We took this phrase to 
signify that a contract made (or at least attempted to be made) had 
somehow been marred or qualitatively spoiled, or made bad, defective or 
ineffectual in some way; the contract (or attempted contract) had been 
invalidated, impaired or destroyed by some reason that the law recognizes 
as effective for that purpose. A ‘vitiating factor’ must — at least according 
ordinary language 24  — somehow render the relevant contractual 
relationship (or attempted contractual relationship) ‘impure’ or ‘faulty’, or 
generally adversely affect the juristic quality of what is asserted to be a 
jural act that alters the normative status of its participants. 
Assuming that denotation to be more or less accurate, ‘taxonomical’ 
questions arose concerning where various ‘vitiating factors’ sat (or ought 
to be seen as sitting) along a possible spectrum of recognized exculpatory 
reasons: Which reasons belonged together and which did not? Did all 
vitiating factors render the contract ‘defective’ or ‘impure’ in the same 
manner? If not, should that affect our instructional scaffolding and design 
decisions?25 
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not always ‘vitiate’ the contract in the same way. Some (fundamental) forms of mistake result 
in no contract arising at all, whereas causative misrepresentation simply supplies a reason to 
rescind a contract that clearly has been formed under the normal rules of contract formation.  
 Inevitably, considerations besides taxonomy drive the sequencing of 
subject matter within a contract-law (or any other) course, including the 
need to appropriately moderate the ‘cognitive load’ of one’s students — the 
idea that instruction must be adapted to the expertise of the learner.26 Some 
topics, for example, may logically (or taxonomically) belong to an early 
stage of a subject being taught but, owing to the complexity of the topic 
(say), may nevertheless be better postposed for treatment at a later juncture, 
when the learner is better equipped cognitively to manage the level of detail, 
difficulty or intricacies involved.27 
Returning to textbooks as proxies for possible contract-law syllabi in 
this area, one encounters occasional examples of ‘over-inclusion’ within 
the universe of ‘vitiating factors’ (at least as we would prefer to understand 
them). McCamus, for instance, mentioned above, groups together, all as 
‘vitiating factors’, the divers phenomena of misrepresentation, duress, 
undue influence and unconscionability, illegality, mistake and frustration, 
when every student of contract law will quickly come to appreciate that 
illegality and frustration, for example, function to excuse non-performance 
of contractual obligation in very different ways, and for quite different 
reasons, than do the other exculpatory categories enumerated in 
McCamus’s cluster. They have nothing to do, for example, with ‘defective 
transactional consent’, which presents a reason for exculpation that is 
internal to the contractual relationship. 28  To be sure, illegality and 
frustration are (at least in part) external reasons for not enforcing a 
contractual relationship that is affected by either (or both) of those reasons. 
And while illegality certainly bears upon the jural quality of the agreement 
struck between the parties — either in its formation, performance or 
enforcement — and so is naturally accommodated by the ordinary 
connotations of the term ‘vitiation’, frustration has nothing to do with the 
juristic quality of the parties’ legal contractual relationship at all. Parties 
affected by a frustrating event (other than supervening illegality, at least) 
are, by operation of law, excused from performing their executory 
contractual obligations not because those obligations are somehow 
invalidly, impurely or unjustly acquired or held, but rather because it would, 
in the light of the supervening, ‘radically different’, circumstances, be 
                                                          
26  See generally Centre for Education Statistics and Education, Cognitive load theory: Research 
that teachers really need to understand (September 2017) 
<https://www.cese.nsw.gov.au//images/stories/PDF/cognitive-load-theory-VR_AA3.pdf>. 
27  So, for example, in our own contract-law offerings at the University of Queensland, although 
we introduce the student to the concept of ‘mistake’ in the very first class of the Principles of 
Contractual Agreement course (via Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch D 215 (CA)), we actually 
teach the detail of the legal phenomena of contractual mistake much later in subject — along 
with other ‘vitiating factors’ taught in the Principles of Contractual Liability course. We do 
this even though we believe that much of the law relating to contractual mistake belongs to 
the principles governing contract formation (offer and acceptance and certainty, especially), 
but we consider the mistake cases to be just too ‘heavy going’ for students who are very new 
to the study of law, and so we wait until they are cognitively better equipped to handle the 
material later into their course of study. 
28  That is to say, the contract has been vitiated by some factor internal to the parties’ own 
relationship inter se (such as intra-relational consent or behaviour), and not by some factor 
that has impacted that relationship from the outside (such as illegality or frustration).  
 unjust now to hold them to an obligation, or set of obligations, to which 
they never objectively intended to be bound: ‘Non haec in foedera veni. It 
was not this that I promised to do.’29 In other words, frustration properly 
belongs in the realm of ‘discharge’ of a contract rather than with its 
‘vitiation’, and that is where we chose to locate it in our own course. 
But even within the other (internalist) vitiating factors that McCamus 
identifies — misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionability 
and mistake — important reasons might remain for treating each or some 
of them as quite distinct justifications for dispensing from legal contractual 
obligation. For although they all appear, at least at first blush, to share in 
common an underlying curial concern for the quality of the inter-partes 
consent brought to a transaction by the relief-seeking party, the impurity (if 
found) in that consent does not function in the same way across all of the 
various exculpatory categories. As a result, different vitiating factors have 
different effects upon the affected transaction. For example, certain types 
of contractual mistake, such as fundamental common mistake, cross-
purposes-style mutual mistake and non est factum, function essentially to 
determine whether the assent that was signalled to the impugned 
transaction was effective to operate as a source of legal contractual 
obligation in the first place — that is to say, to determine whether the 
consent brought to the transaction was capable of functioning as an 
effective offer or (as the case may be) acceptance, with the consequence 
that any failure of consent in that regard is a denial of the creation of legal 
contractual obligation altogether, the alleged ‘contract’ being adjudged 
void ab initio.30 In these types of cases, ‘vitiation’ effectively means that 
there has been a contractual ‘failure to launch’. In other cases, though, such 
as misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and unconscionable dealing, 
the consent manifested by the relief-seeking party is sufficient to function 
as an effective offer and acceptance, and hence as a source of legal 
contractual obligation; however, any obligation so assumed is treated as 
defeasible after the event, at the election of the defective-consent-giving 
party (and subject to various defences on the other side), the affected 
contract being ‘voidable’ rather than void ab initio. 
Needless to say, the formal validity of a contract is no mark of its 
justness inter se. But even within the world of ‘valid-but-defeasible’ 
contracts it is possible that the consent that was brought to an impugned 
transaction may be regarded as defective or unjust in differential ways, and 
for differential reasons, as between the standalone categories of 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionable dealing and 
personal incapacity (for example), such that some sort of exercise in sub-
classification is possible, or desirable, or even necessary. Indeed, if consent 
were seen to be compromised in the self-same way across all of those 
                                                          
29  Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696, 729 (Lord Radcliffe). 
30  For a lucid explanation of this, see P Benson, ‘The Unity of Contract Law’ in P Benson (ed), 
The Theory of Contract: New Essays (CUP, 2001) 141ff. One of us also cashes out the 
distinction between ‘assent’ and ‘consent’ in relation to the ‘bindingness’ of contractual 
obligations in R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (OUP, 2003) 89–90. 
 various grounds of relief, there would presumably be no need to maintain 
separate doctrinal categories at all; and yet the law, quite rightly in our view, 
has resisted significant proposals to amalgamate or collapse some, many or 
all of the doctrines that have traditionally regulated the quality of party-
consent brought to an objectively concluded contract.31 
All this may seem trite, but it nevertheless underscores the point that 
there are important taxonomical choices needing to be made in the 
presentation of the subject matter of ‘vitiating factors’, both in the textbook 
and in the higher-education classroom. The choices, no doubt, can be 
difficult and, at times, contentious. We were reminded of this recently in 
Australia when the High Court published its decision in Thorne in late 
2017.32  There, a wife challenged both a pre-nuptial and a post-nuptial 
financial agreement entered into between herself and her husband some 
four years prior to the couple’s separation in 2011. Although the wife knew 
from the outset of the parties’ first meeting that she would have to ‘sign 
paper’ so as to protect the husband’s assets in favour of his adult children, 
and had received and fully understood independent legal advice before 
entering into the impugned transactions, she only entered into the 
agreements because, some 11 days before the wedding was scheduled to 
occur (her family having already arrived in Australia from overseas, the 
invitations having already been sent out, the dress having already been 
made, and the wedding reception having already been booked), the 
husband told her that, unless she signed, the wedding would be called off.33 
The pre-nuptial agreement was signed a mere four days before the marriage 
occurred, and the post-nuptial one was signed a month or so later. After the 
couple separated, the wife claimed that she should be relieved of the normal 
consequences of having assented by signing the impugned agreements, as 
that assent, it was alleged, was the product of duress, undue influence 
and/or unconscionable dealing (there being no relevant defences to relief 
available on the husband’s side). In a plurality judgment of five and two 
                                                          
31  Of course, an infamous judicial attempt to rationalize various exculpatory doctrines of 
contract law in terms of a legal response to ‘inequality of bargaining power’ is to be found in 
Lord Denning’s judgment in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] 1 QB 326, 337–9. For other, 
non-judicial attempts, see A Phang, ‘Undue Influence — Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ 
[1995] Journal of Business Law 552; D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A 
Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 479; A Phang and H Tjio, ‘The Uncertain 
Boundaries of Undue Influence’ [2002] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 231, 
232–34, 241–43; A Phang and H Tjio, ‘Drawing Lines in the Sand? Duress, Undue Influence 
and Unconscionability Revisited’ (2003) 11 Restitution Law Review 110, 117ff; D Capper, 
‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 
403; British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Proposals for Unfair Contracts Relief 
(September 2011) < http://www.bcli.org/sites/default/files/2011-09-28_BCLI_Report_on_ 
Proposals_for_Unfair_Contracts_Relief_(FINAL).pdf>; Marcus Moore, ‘Why Does Lord 
Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects for Finding a Unifying Principle for 
Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability’ (2018) 134 Law Quarterly Review 257. The 
Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore, in a ‘coda’ to its judgment in BOM v BOK 
[2018] SGCA 83 (29 November 2018), refused (at [158]ff) to assimilate undue influence and 
(a ‘broad doctrine’ of) unconscionable dealing under a so-called ‘umbrella doctrine’.  
32  Thorne (2017) 91 ALJR 1260. 
33  Compare Engle v Carswell [1995] 5 WWR 301, where on similar but distinguishable facts, 
the result went the other way. 
 single judgments, the High Court unanimously held that both financial 
agreements were voidable on the ground of ‘unconscionable conduct’ (or 
unconscionable dealing): that the husband had, effectively, 
unconscientiously exploited the wife’s ‘special vulnerability’, namely, her 
situational inability at the relevant time to exercise ‘free agency’ with 
respect to the husband. This inability seriously affected her capacity to 
make a worthwhile judgement in relation to her decision to enter into the 
impugned agreements. The Court, however, was then fractured as to 
whether Thorne was also a case of undue influence and/or duress, and, if 
one of undue influence, as to whether undue influence had been established 
on the facts.34 Accordingly, no clarification was ultimately provided on the 
precise conceptual and practical demarcation between ‘duress’ and ‘undue 
influence’. Neither was it resolved whether common-law duress claims are 
(or ought to be) confined to threatened or actual unlawful conduct, with 
lawful-pressure cases belonging instead to some equitable exculpatory 
category such as undue influence or unconscionable dealing. 
Judging at least by our survey of the selection of contract-law texts 
mentioned earlier, more thought seems to have gone into the organization 
and presentation of subject matter in some cases than in others. With the 
exception of those writing from a restitutionary or ‘unjust enrichment’ 
perspective (for whom ‘taxonomy’, it seems, is core business 35 ), the 
authors or editors of leading contract-law texts vary greatly in their 
taxonomization of subject matter, at least in relation to the so-called 
‘vitiating factors’. (Again, we suspect that this applies equally to the 
designers and deliverers of contract-law curricula around the Anglo-
Commonwealth as well.) The spectrum ranges from those who 
demonstrate little to no strategy around the organizational choices made, 
with each ‘factor’ or ‘doctrine’ simply being presented as the subject of an 
atomistic chapter among the totality of chapters comprising the work (eg, 
Treitel and Fridman), to those where the author(s) have clearly thought 
deeply about the anatomy of their work (eg, Farnsworth and Swan and 
Adamski). Most contributions lie somewhere in between, with attempts 
being made at least to cluster exculpatory categories within distinct parts 
dedicated to ‘factors tending to defeat contractual liability’ (eg, Anson) or 
‘vitiating factors’ (eg, Carter and Paterson, Robertson and Duke). Some 
                                                          
34  The plurality of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ held it to be a case of ‘actual 
undue influence’, rather than ‘duress’ (as the primary judge had held: see Thorne [2015] FCCA 
484 (4 March 2015) [94]–[96] (Judge Demack), although the jurisdictional demarcation 
between the two is not particularly clear. In a separate judgment, Gordon J held that there was 
no undue influence, essentially because the wife had entered into the impugned transactions 
with her eyes open and her will or ‘free agency’ had not, metaphorically speaking, been 
‘overborne’. Her Honour said nothing about duress. The remaining judge, Nettle J, would 
have treated the case as one of duress, but for a decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149 
holding that duress should be limited to threatened or actual unlawful conduct only. In the end, 
though, his Honour found it unnecessary to decide the issue. He also said nothing about undue 
influence. 
35  Compare P Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 
University of Western Australia Law Review 1; Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 2006). 
 authors even reduce ‘vitiating factors’ to what they perceive to be 
meaningful phenomenological subcategories such as ‘misinformation’ and 
‘abuse of power’ (eg, Paterson, Robertson and Duke). 
Now, in our experience, decisions regarding the taxonomization of 
‘vitiating factors’ are contingent and perspectival (including whether they 
should be taught within the standard contract-law curriculum or outside it). 
This is hardly surprising, given that anyone who proffers an interpretative 
account of an area of the law — any area of the law — is bound to have 
operated, self-consciously or otherwise, according to a system of normative 
belief or legal comprehension beyond the raw data (case law) being ordered 
and explained. That, we suspect, is inevitable. But from the standpoint of 
responsible andragogy, it would be better if authors’ or educators’ reasons 
for the taxonomical decisions made were adequately communicated to the 
intended learners, and we do not always see that occurring (other than is a 
superficial way), at least within our sampling of standard contract-law texts 
from around the Commonwealth — even in those works whose anatomy 
strikes us as sufficiently idiosyncratic as to require it. 
An interesting feature of the surveyed contract-law texts, however, is 
just how frequently certain of the vitiating factors are collocated in 
representation of the relevant law. For example, there would appear to be 
considerable consensus that, at least for the purposes (presumably) of 
organizing conceptual knowledge so as to aid comprehension of the 
applicable law, the exculpatory doctrines of duress, undue influence and 
unconscionable dealing (or unconscionable bargain) somehow, or for some 
reason, belong together. A number of authors deal with them either in a 
collective chapter (eg, Chitty, Treitel, Anson, Greig and Davis, Fridman, 
McCamus, and Burrows, Finn and Todd) or as a distinct subcategory 
within a larger cluster of related law (eg, Paterson, Robertson and Duke). 
As to why they are perceived to belong together, this is not always 
meaningfully explained; but clearly many writers see them under the rubric 
or through the lens of a curial concern for ‘abuse of a dominant position’ 
(eg, Greig and Davis), ‘abuse of the bargaining process’ (eg, Farnsworth), 
‘abuse of power’ (eg, Carter and Paterson, Robertson and Duke), or 
‘exploitation’ (eg, Burrows, Finn and Todd). The authors of Anson present 
their collocation of duress, undue influence and unconscionable 
dealing/bargain simply in terms of ‘three vitiating factors based on the 
improper conduct of one party, the vulnerability of the other, or a 
combination of the two’.36 However, and with respect, it is difficult to see 
how just the ‘improper conduct of one party’ with respect to another’s 
vulnerability could ever adequately explain the operation of an exculpatory 
doctrine, as presumably such doctrines are not simply one-sidedly punitive. 
Nor could an exculpatory doctrine be explained just by ‘the vulnerability 
of the other [party]’, as presumably the doctrines follow the contours of 
‘corrective’ justice rather than ‘distributive’ justice (of which more in Part 
                                                          
36  Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 11, 374. 
 IV below).37  In our view, the only plausible explanation of significant 
exculpatory doctrines such as duress, undue influence and unconscionable 
dealing must be bilateral, or dual-sided in nature — a properly weighted 
‘combination of the two’. 
IV  How We Teach Contract Vitiation in Our Own Course 
‘Why should you expect the [rules] … of the game to be different 
from the game itself?’38 
For what it is worth, and considering the various discrimina mentioned in 
Part III above, the following essentially39 describes our own approach to 
teaching contract vitiation to early-stage law students at the University of 
Queensland. With the exception of ‘illegality’ (which we teach as a 
separate topic on vitiation after canvassing ‘internalist’ vitiating factors), 
we begin by clustering the various factors that might vitiate a contractual 
relationship around the concept of ‘legally responsible consent’. This, we 
apprehend, is likely to draw little or no dissent. Given that contracts are, at 
their conceptual core, ‘voluntary’ or ‘consensual’ legal relationships, any 
circumstance, condition or conduct that undermines the genuineness of the 
consent brought by either or both of the parties to a dealing or encounter 
must, ex necessitate, strike at the very heart of any legal relationship that 
resulted from the dealing or encounter. Unsurprisingly, then, the law tends 
to emphasize not what constitutes or defines a ‘valid’ contractual consent 
but rather its opposite: circumstances or conditions that defeat or weaken 
the force of what would otherwise be valid and binding consent.40 
More controversial, perhaps, is the question of whether defective 
consent alone suffices to explain the vitiation of a bargain transaction; or 
must something more, such as superior-party misconduct in relation to the 
procurement or receipt of the consent also be shown? In general, we think 
so (at least where the relevant vitiating factor does not operate to prevent 
                                                          
37  For a nice statement of the corrective justice account of contract law (with a predictably 
Kantian hue), see EJ Weinrib, ‘Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies’ (2003) 
78 Chicago-Kent Law Review 55.  
38  K Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana Publications, 1930) 150. 
39  Space does not permit complete coverage in this description. We shall mostly limit the 
discussion to significant exculpatory doctrines like misrepresentation, duress, undue influence 
and unconscionable dealing. Obviously, vitiating factors that are sourced in parliamentary 
authority, such as ss 18 and 20–22 of the Australian Consumer Law (governing ‘misleading 
or deceptive conduct’ and ‘unconscionability’, respectively), are not limited in the way that 
those that are creatures of the common law and equity are constitutionally constrained. 
40  Hart, for example, argued that since contract is what he called a ‘defeasible concept’, it is to 
be ‘defined through exceptions and not by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions whether 
physical or psychological’: HLA Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (1949) 
49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 171, 189. For this reason, Hart argued, a court is 
bound to make reference to the ‘extremely heterogeneous defences and the manner in which 
they respectively serve to defeat or weaken claims in contract’: at 176; and that ‘the positive 
looking doctrine “consent must be true, full and free” is only accurate as a statement of the 
law if treated as a compendious reference to the defences with which claims in contract may 
be weakened or met’: at 177. 
 the formation of the alleged contract itself). As traditionally conceived, 
most of the vitiating factors — or, rather, the legal or equitable doctrines 
that administer them — are essentially concerned with and attracted by 
distinct forms of pre-contractual conduct that subject, actively or passively, 
the relief-seeking party to an improper motive for intentional entry into a 
lawful contract: improper pressure, misleading causative statements, naked 
exploitation, unfair persuasion, and the like. In terms of the textbook 
treatments of the subject matter mentioned earlier, then, we would align 
our approach to that of authors such as Farnsworth, who rubricized many 
of the exculpatory doctrines in this area under the banner of ‘policing’ the 
parties’ agreement for (among other things) behaviour constituting an 
‘abuse of the bargaining process’. In other words, the law apprehends that 
there are ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ ways of influencing another 
person to contract with you, and most of the relevant exculpatory doctrines 
in this field assist us to understand (and hopefully then to predict) where 
the line is to be drawn in relation to particular types of frequently 
encountered (and indeed expected) bargaining behaviours: threats, puffs, 
bluffs, shading the truth, disguising intentions, nondisclosure, pressing for 
advantage, and the like. On this view, we maintain, the various exculpatory 
doctrines that govern the means by which contractual relationships are 
formed, and in particular provide for transaction avoidance in the event of 
imperfect formation, are designed to deter one party (D) from failing to 
obtain the other party’s (P’s) legally responsible contractual consent. D’s 
failure to obtain P’s legally responsible consent may result in a type of 
transactional injustice against P that warrants rescission of the transaction. 
Given the centrality of consent to the interpersonal justice of a 
contractual relationship, it made sense for us to organize vitiating factors 
around the various ways in which transactional consent might be 
compromised. In order to qualify as ‘genuine’ or ‘responsible’ consent, we 
took it as axiomatic that a party who signified contractual assent must have 
(in addition to possessing legal capacity) been operating from a minimal 
baseline of information and liberty which the law regards as both necessary 
and sufficient for ‘voluntary’ or ‘autonomous’ human action.41 Problems 
with contractual consent generally arise either because one of the 
contracting parties lacked information that was material to his or her 
transactional decision-making (or perhaps the cognitive capacity to process 
such information that was readily available), or else he or she lacked the 
ability to act sufficiently ‘freely’ in relation to his or her decision to enter 
into contract in question. At least to accommodate the learning needs of 
early-stage law students, then, we considered it useful to cluster the subject 
matter of ‘vitiation’ under the heads of ‘information problems’ and 
‘volition problems’. The former encloses (primarily) the exculpatory 
categories of ‘mistake’ and ‘misleading conduct inducing contract 
formation’ (both misrepresentation and the Australian Consumer Law 
                                                          
41  Aristotle, for example, in Nicomachean Ethics (trans T Irwin, (Hackett, 1985) 1110ff 
described both ‘ignorance’ and ‘force’ as the two forms of involuntariness. 
 protections), while the latter comprises (again, primarily) the exculpatory 
doctrines of duress and undue influence. Cases of ‘special disadvantage’ or 
‘serious disequality’ more generally, which might straddle both 
informational and processing problems, as well as volitional deficiencies 
(eg, pressing need), is dealt with separately by reference to the equitable 
jurisdiction to relieve against an ‘unconscionable dealing’. We also engage 
separately with the emergent phenomena of ‘statutory unconscionability’, 
as well as the various legal, equitable and statutory solutions available to 
deal with ‘third-party impropriety’ (surety problems, essentially).42 
Also axiomatic to our approach to subject design in this area was the 
premise that any proper comprehension of stated-assisted transaction 
avoidance must be grounded in the relevant institutional setting that is the 
context of the law’s superintendence: that any legal approach to contract 
vitiation must reflect the basic intellectual, justificatory and institutional 
forms of order presupposed (here) by the classical liberal conception of 
contract, at least where and to the extent that that conception has not been 
statutorily modified in Australia. This implies an acknowledgement that 
the nuances of transaction avoidance may vary depending on the social 
practice within which the impugned transfer of value occurred, so that even 
though many of the exculpatory doctrines discussed in the course apply 
equally to non-contractual transfers of value (such as gifts) as to contractual 
ones, there is no reason to think that the doctrines always operate 
identically across each setting (although sometimes they do). 43  This 
potentially complicates the approach to the vitiation of contracts in contrast 
to gifts, say.44 Whereas the finality of a gift transaction might focus more 
                                                          
42   The development of the law of undue influence in England has been affected (we think for the 
worse) by the fact that many prominent decisions have concerned sureties: eg, Barclays Bank 
plc v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417; Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 
773 (‘Etridge’). Perhaps in part due to the development of a sui generis ‘wives’ special equity’ 
doctrine, Australian law allows for a clearer taxonomic distinction between straightforward 
cases of undue influence (in which the party seeking to enforce the contract exercised the 
influence in question) and those which involve another party (usually a creditor) to the 
transaction that is tainted by undue influence: Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; Garcia v 
National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395. The clearer demarcation between the two 
types of case is also partly attributable to Australia’s more mature doctrine of unconscionable 
dealing, which also functions to capture cases involving sureties: Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 
447.  
43  For example, it is well known that undue influence operates differently in equity in relation to 
inter vivos transactions than it does in probate law with respect to testamentary dispositions. 
See, generally, Pauline Ridge, ‘Equitable Undue Influence and Wills’ (2004) 120 Law 
Quarterly Review 617. Also, in relation to inter vivos transactions, undue influence might 
operate slightly differently in relation to contracts (or transactions ‘of purchase’) than with 
gifts. See, eg, Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 135–6 (Dixon J) (‘the matters affecting 
[the transaction’s] validity are necessarily somewhat different’). See also Hugh Beale, ‘Undue 
Influence and Unconscionability’ in Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith, above n 1, ch 5, 
98–99 (on the significance of ‘disadvantageous transactions’). 
44  In addition to the differences between gifts and contracts requiring possible application 
adjustments in relation to undue influence (see above n 44), it is also occasionally suggested 
that the unconscionable dealing jurisdiction may be more liberally applied in relation to gift 
transactions as opposed to contracts: see, eg, Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646, 649 
(Latham CJ), 655 (Rich J); Scott v Wise [1986] 2 NZLR 484, 492–3 (Somers J), quoted in 
Dark v Boock [1991] 1 NZLR 496, 502 (Heron J); Williams v Maalouf [2005] VSC 346 (1 
September 2005) [192] (Hargrave J). See also, more generally, P Watts, ‘Restitution — A 
 squarely on the question of the ‘voluntariness’ of the ‘motive’ that produced 
the impugned one-way transfer of value, gifting as a social practice lacks 
the ‘game’ element of the free competitive bargaining that we generally 
associate with the interest structure of those who participate within the 
contract institution. Genuine liberty of contract presupposes freedom to 
succeed as well as to fail, and that tactical practices like ‘pressing for 
advantage’ and ‘enriching oneself at the expense of another’ are all in the 
name of the contracting ‘game’ — they are ‘defining characteristics’ or 
‘endemic features’ of bargaining and of bargains,45 if not the principal point 
of negotiating toward an outcome ‘where something of value is at stake’.46 
The law’s approach to contract vitiation must, it seems to us, take this 
significantly into account, at least in the absence of a clear statutory 
override (such as in the case of consumer-protection legislation, for 
example).  
Taking the liberal conception as the launch-point for our discussion of 
the vitiation of contracts, it is emphasized that, subject to capacity and 
legality, we are each free as formal jural equals to engage in transfer and 
exchange, and to enlist others in the pursuit of our own ends (just as they 
are free to enlist us likewise), and it is generally no business of the state to 
second-guess the wisdom of transactions that result from the exercise of 
this (inter)personal freedom, whether they be contracts or gifts. This 
injunction, it is said, applies no matter how ‘improvident, unreasonable, or 
unjust’ the particular transaction may appear to be.47 The common law, 
including equity, does not exist to assist, officiously or paternalistically, 
those of full age ‘who repent of foolish undertakings’ or regretted 
dispositions.48 
But as is well known, ‘formal equality’ is not ‘actual equality’. For a 
variety of reasons, both constitutional and situational, people occasionally 
find themselves seriously mismatched vis-à-vis others in particular social 
and transactional encounters. And although, according the liberal 
conception, no objection can be taken to the mere existence of (even very 
serious) inequality of bargaining power between actors per se,49 the law 
can nevertheless be expected to make it harder for power-holders to use 
their unofficial interpersonal power by ensuring that such power is only 
used consistently with the injunction against using free and equal moral 
agents ‘merely instrumentally’ for personal gain. For failure to secure a 
                                                          
Property Principle and a Services Principle’ (1995) Restitution Law Review 49, 58–9; D 
Nolan, ‘The Classical Legacy and Modern English Contract Law’ (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 603, 610–12. 
45  PD Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (LBC, 1987) 110. 
46  EH Norton, ‘Bargaining and the Ethic of Process’ (1989) 64 New York University Law Rev 
493, 530. The analogy of negotiation to ‘game’ is perhaps best suggested in H Raiffa, The Art 
and Science of Negotiation (Belknap Press, 1982). See also PH Gulliver, Disputes and 
Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Academic Press, 1979) 5–6. 
47  Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106, 1109 (Salmond J). 
48  Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226, 235 (Somers J). 
49  See, eg, R Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974) 224–7; EJ Weinrib, ‘Right 
and Advantage in Private Law’ (1989) 10 Cardozo Law Review 1283; Alec Lobb Garages Ltd 
v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173, 183 (Dillon LJ). 
 person’s consent before taking resources from him or her is always (legal 
authorization aside) a failure to respect that person’s status as a ‘freely 
choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious moral personality’.50 
On this view, it is unsurprising that courts have consistently renounced 
any suggestion that a contract might be vulnerable to rescission (or a state-
imposed enforcement disability) just because it happened to represent the 
outcome of (even very serious) ‘inequality of bargaining power’,51 or that 
‘good conscience’ somehow ‘require[s] parties to contractual negotiations 
to forfeit their advantages, or neglect their own interests’. 52  Were the 
vitiating doctrines of (or relating to) contract law to operate in a purely 
redistributive fashion, this would effectively destroy self-ownership of 
natural advantages (like negotiation skill and position), thereby 
undermining deeply held convictions about individual rights in a free 
society.53 In such a society, fundamental considerations of liberty constrain 
us to view private-law relationships primarily in terms of ‘rights’ rather 
than ‘advantages’.54 And, of course, there being at least two parties to a 
contractual relationship, the transactional liberty of both participants in the 
exchange encounter must be taken adequately into account when 
formulating just principles governing state interference with objectively 
concluded bargain transactions. At least in the case of the typical 
synallagmatic contract, the decision to invalidate a contract will always 
affect both plaintiff and defendant as rights-holders. Once the contract is 
validly formed, there must be some rationale beyond the defective consent 
of the plaintiff that is capable of defeating the defendant’s right to the 
performance of the contract. Clear statutory authorization aside, neither 
party’s situation can ever be viewed in isolation. Ordinarily, there will be 
insufficient reason for disappointing the contractual expectations of one 
contracting party, D, unless D ought to bear some agency-responsible 
‘blame’ for the other party’s, P’s, inability to bring a fully responsible 
consent to the impugned transaction. That P’s contractual assent happened 
to result from some substantial impairment of bargaining capacity or 
opportunity cannot alone plausibly provide the reason, since, on the liberal 
conception, this would simply fail to respect D’s freedom (to order, as best 
D fit, D’s affairs through co-operative private exchange with P), which 
freedom is as much at stake as P’s equivalent liberty in legal contractual 
settings. To say that D ‘deserves’ to lose a contractual benefit derived from 
P is thus generally not a conclusion that the quality of P’s will or judgement 
or consent did not for some reason pass legal or equitable muster, but rather 
an evaluation of both D’s and P’s behaviour, and the risks that each can 
fairly be taken to have assumed (including as to each other’s strategic or 
                                                          
50  Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press, 1978) 29. Compare also JG 
Murphy and JL Coleman, Philosophy of Law (Westview Press, rev ed, 1990) 173–4. 
51  Alec Lobb Garages Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173, 183 (Dillon LJ). 
52  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 
214 CLR 51, 64 [11] (Gleeson CJ). 
53  Robert Nozick thus argued that a justification for personal skills need not be given — some 
qualities are simply possessed: Nozick, above n 49, 224–7. 
54  See generally Weinrib, above n 49. 
 tactical bargaining behaviours), within the context of the impugned 
transaction at hand. In other words, a contract is only susceptible to 
invalidity where the defendant has acted unjustifiably or improperly in 
inducing the plaintiff to contract with the defendant.55 
Certainly, when we initially conceived our Principles of Contractual 
Liability course, we took this to be a descriptively accurate account of the 
law, at least as judged by how the vast majority of the exculpatory doctrines 
of law and equity were expressed and applied by Australian courts in 
relation to contracts. For in each situation where a particular doctrine 
applied, there was, typically, not only a ‘defective consent’ on P’s side of 
the impugned transaction, but also an agency-responsible failure, on the 
part of D, to meet some applicable standard of conduct or norm of 
interpersonal treatment that allowed us to say that any consent produced in 
violation of that standard or norm cannot be treated as ‘fully legally 
responsible’ on the part of P vis-à-vis D, the beneficiary of that consent. 
The applicable standard or norm might, for example, be one of ‘truth-
telling’ (eg, misrepresentation or statutory misleading conduct), ‘rights-
respecting’ (eg, regular duress), ‘trust-maintenance’ or ‘avoiding conflicts 
of interest and duty in limited-access arrangements’ (eg, Class 2 undue 
influence),56 or ‘taking reasonable precautions toward the avoidance of a 
foreseeable risk of ignorance, error or third-party imposition’ (eg, the 
Garcia-style ‘special equity’ in favour of ‘volunteer wives’57). Moreover, 
the failure to meet the applicable standard or norm of conduct could be 
considered ‘wrongful’ regardless of whether it happened to be 
accompanied by a predatory or exploitative state of mind on the part of D; 
duress and undue influence, for example, like misrepresentation, can be 
‘wholly innocent’.58 All that matters is that D’s conduct was genuinely 
‘agency responsible’ in the sense that it relevantly related to choices that D 
made, or was capable of making, ex ante entry into the impugned 
transaction, such that it fairly lay within D’s power to have made things 
otherwise than what they in fact became the result of D’s enjoyment of 
                                                          
55   On duress and unconscionability as the ‘proposing [of] a wrong’, see Charles Fried, Contract 
as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2015) 97. 
Writing in the context of promises (rather than contracts), David Owens argues that a promise 
is invalidated only where it is induced by conduct that wrongs the promisor (ie, the conduct 
will only invalidate the promise where it breaches a right of the promisor): ‘Duress, Deception, 
and the Validity of a Promise’ (2007) 116 Mind 293.  
56  See generally Robert Flannigan, ‘The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2004) 83 
Canadian Bar Review 35 (reprinted [2004] New Zealand Law Review 215); Robert Flannigan, 
‘The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability’ [2009] New Zealand Law Review 375; Robert 
Flannigan, ‘Presumed Undue Influence: The False Partition from Fiduciary Accountability’ 
(2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 171. 
57  Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ). 
58  See, eg, North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd [1979] QB 705 (duress 
found even without knowledge of the effect of the coercer’s conduct on the victim’s choice 
conditions); Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, 
342 (Sir Eric Sachs) (Class 2 undue influence does not depend on ‘any wrongful intention on 
the part of the person who gains the benefit’); Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All ER 35, 43 (Sir 
Donald Nicholls V-C) (influential party did not act ‘morally reprehensibly’). 
 interpersonal power over P. 59  Provided that such agency-responsibility 
existed on D’s part, it is always possible to say that an exercise, by D, of 
interpersonal power over P, for D’s own gratification, has occurred; for in 
every such case, D, actively or by omission, subjects P to an improper 
reason (or motive) for intentional action, namely, entry into the impugned 
transaction — a reason or motive from which, being inconsistent with 
responsible human action, P ought to have been free. Regardless of D’s 
accompanying mental state, D inevitably exercises, for him- or herself, an 
excessive degree of personal autonomy resulting from the parties’ 
relationship; and P is thus inevitably ‘victimized’ by D’s privileging his or 
her own interests while using P ‘merely instrumentally’, thereby violating 
P’s general ‘right’ (ie, ‘legal immunity’) not to have resources (or value) 
transferred away from him or her, under the colour of a formally ‘valid’ 
contract, without P’s fully legally responsible consent. 
Given the various ways in which D may subject P to an improper reason 
for assenting to a contract that D desires, it made sense for us to try to 
explain most of the vitiating factors associated with contract rescission 
precisely in terms of the varying ways in which the Ds of this world might 
‘exercise interpersonal power’ over the Ps of this world for that purpose. 
At least as they apply to regular contracts,60 the exculpatory doctrines of 
law and equity ultimately regulate against the abuse of interpersonal power 
affecting consent rather than the impairment of personal consent 
simpliciter, and each doctrine appears to be attracted by a specific 
manifestation of such abuse, which both explains and justifies their 
continued intellectual and practical separation rather than collapse or 
amalgamation. 
Some doctrines, such as misrepresentation and duress, are clearly 
designed to regulate against D exercising power over P by actively altering 
P’s decision-making environment in such a way that P is motivated 
(induced) to do as D desires. With misrepresentation, D introduces a false 
factual statement into the parties’ pre-contractual negotiations upon which, 
consistently with D’s actual or putative intention when making the 
statement, P relies. That the false statement was contrary to the law’s 
universal norm of truth-telling when it comes to pre-contractual assertions 
of fact implies that D has necessarily motivated P to act by presenting her 
                                                          
59  For a lucid account of agency responsibility in this sense, see J Evans, ‘Choice and 
Responsibility’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 97, especially 99–101. See 
also A P Simester, ‘Agency” (1996) 15 Law and Philosophy 159, especially 177–81. 
60  We merely speculate, but do not conclude, as to whether different principles of vitiation might 
legitimately apply to different types of contract, or across different contractual settings. For 
example, in Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2013) 298 ALR 35, the High Court seemed to 
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might be applied more leniently outside the context of a so-called ‘arm’s length commercial 
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case. In Thorne (2017) 91 ALJR 1260, in contrast, the High Court was prepared to apply the 
ordinary doctrines of law and equity (duress, undue influence and unconscionable dealing) to 
financial agreements entered into under Part VIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as if 
they were just regular contracts rather than ones sanctioned by the Family Court under the Act 
as a qualification to that court’s statutory jurisdiction. 
 with an unacceptable reason for doing what D desired, regardless of the 
quality of mind that happened to accompany the false statement: D should 
have found out the truth before speaking a falsity. Moreover, given that P 
is generally under no responsibility to investigate the veracity of factual 
statements made to him or her for the purpose of inducing entry into a 
contract,61 D’s misleading conduct is inconsistent with ‘voluntary’ (hence 
legally responsible) action on the part of P. Accordingly, any transaction so 
concluded ought to, in the absence of a relevant defence available to D, be 
treated as voidable as against D. (Obviously, the law’s protection to those 
injured by false causative statements in commercial contexts has been 
expanded extensively since the enactment of s 52 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth), now s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.) 
With duress, D manipulates P’s decision to enter into a contract by 
exercising coercive power over P, that is, by proposing to make P worse off 
relative to P’s existing entitlements or legal protections in P’s favour (eg, 
under criminal law, tort law or contract law) unless P agrees to D’s 
particular demand. When successful, it can be seen how, by duress, D has 
motivated P to do as D desires through fear of unwanted consequences: P 
would prefer to abandon one right (ie, whatever it is that D has demanded, 
which P would prefer to retain) in order to protect another right or protected 
freedom (eg, P’s right to bodily, proprietary or economic integrity), which 
P perceives to be the lesser of the two evils comprising the choice 
conditions that D has created for P. Provided that D’s application of 
pressure reduced P’s options to the point of P having ‘no reasonable 
alternative’ than submission to D’s demand, and P did in fact submit (at 
least partly, if not substantially) for that reason, then D must be treated as 
having motivated P’s entry into the impugned contract (or contract 
modification) by presenting P with an unacceptable reason for doing what 
D desired. D has, through the application of illegitimate pressure, denied P 
a fair opportunity to exercise P’s normal capacities when entering into a 
voluntary or consensual legal relationship. Of course, the standard case of 
duress involves D threatening P with a consequence that is not D’s to 
dispense, because the threat, if implemented, would be unlawful. But 
duress is not necessarily limited to such cases, as D may exercise duress by 
conditionally proposing to exercise his or her own lawful rights, liberties 
or powers in a manner unwelcome to P or to P’s disadvantage, so as to 
‘exploit’ P’s peculiar vulnerability to being pressed in the circumstances. 
Whether such cases properly belong with the common-law duress doctrine 
or, rather, are better administered under the ‘unconscionable dealing’ or 
‘undue influence’ jurisdictions (for example) is something that we briefly 
explore with our students through lens of the New South Wales Court of 
                                                          
61  See, eg, Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1, 14, 17 (Jessel MR), 22–3 (Baggallay LJ); Smith 
v Land & House Property Corporation (1884) 28 Ch D 7, 17 (Bowen LJ). The position appears 
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 Appeal’s decision (and recommendations) in Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group v Karam.62 
Next off the doctrinal rank for discussion in the course is undue 
influence, which, as an exculpatory category, has become rather elusive in 
recent years, and for no apparent good reason. As with misrepresentation 
and duress, undue influence has traditionally been conceived of as being 
rooted in the principle ‘that a transaction to which consent has been 
obtained by unacceptable means should not be allowed to stand’. 63 
Regarding the nature of those unacceptable means, however, the equitable 
jurisdiction to relieve against an inter vivos transaction induced by undue 
influence is significantly more nuanced than those other two doctrinal 
categories, each of which regulates a distinct and circumscribed form of 
unacceptable transaction-inducing behaviour. Although some undue 
influence cases appear to regulate coercive conduct (albeit by lawful 
means),64 the paradigm case of undue influence is not one of ‘duress’ or 
‘fear’, but rather of ‘unfair’, ‘improper’ or ‘unacceptable’ persuasion.65 D 
generally exercises persuasive power over P by giving P arguments or 
reasons that appeal to P’s (self-perceived) interests or principles, so that P 
prefers to do what D desires over P’s status quo (or over some alternative 
course of action available to P). Generally, persuasion cannot be seen as an 
unacceptable reason for human action, except when it results from ‘one 
party [D] occup[ying] or assum[ing] towards another a position naturally 
involving an ascendancy or influence over that other [P], or a dependence 
or trust on [P’s] part’.66 ‘One occupying such a position’, it has been said, 
‘falls under a duty in which fiduciary characteristics may be seen’:67 ‘It 
is … [D’s] duty to use his position of influence in the interest of no one 
but … [P] who is governed by … [D’s] judgment, gives him his 
dependence and entrusts him with his welfare.’68 
It is generally necessary, therefore, to distinguish between cases of 
undue influence that are ‘relationship-independent’ and those whose 
existence depends precisely on the establishment of a pre-contractual 
relation of the nature just described. In the first category of case — often 
referred to as ‘Class 1’ undue influence — P is induced to contract (or to 
confer some other benefit upon D) within the context of a regular arm’s-
length relationship or encounter. There is nothing ‘special’ about these 
cases at all. Actual wrongdoing in the manner or coercion (or perhaps 
unconscionable dealing) can be established, such that it is arguably 
                                                          
62  Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149 (Beazley, Ipp 
and Basten JJA). 
63  R v Attorney-General for England and Wales [2004] 2 NZLR 577 [21] (emphasis added). 
64  See, eg, Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton and Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389; Robertson v 
Robertson [1930] QWN 41; Langton v Langton [1995] 2 FLR 890; Bank of Scotland v 
Bennett [1997] 1 FLR 801. 
65  Compare American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) §177(1); Etridge 
(No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 794–5 [6]–[7] (Lord Nicholls); American Law Institute, Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) 204.  
66  Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134–5 (Dixon J; Evatt J agreeing). 
67  Ibid 135 (emphasis added). 
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 unnecessary nowadays for the law to recognize such cases as manifesting 
an independent exculpatory category (or at least to refer to them as 
somehow involving ‘undue influence’). The other category of case, 
however — typically dubbed ‘Class 2’ undue influence — is sui generis. 
The cases here involve a completely separate principle (or set of principles) 
directed at avoiding non-consensual or unauthorized conflicts of interest or 
duty in relationships or arrangements that, generically or specifically, 
involve ‘trust and confidence’ (or ‘trust and dependence’).69 The law’s 
focus is not on ‘influence’ at large, but rather on an influential capacity that 
derives from the concession, by one party, of control or authority to the 
other party, or from the reposing of special trust by one party in the other.70 
‘Undue influence’ here entails the use (or indeed mere possible use), 
whether active or passive, of influence that the law expects to be exercised 
solely in the interests of the party subject to the influence, rather than in 
pursuance of an inconsistent personal interest on the part of the other party 
within the scope of the influential relationship or encounter. Undue 
influence is ‘unacceptable’, therefore, and hence responsibility-relieving 
on the victim’s part, because, regardless of how the influence was (or might 
have been) exercised in the particular case (pressure, advice, argument, 
pleading, intercession, misrepresentation, or whatever), it basically 
involves a conflictual use (or possible such use) of a special influential 
capacity on the part of D. For long-standing reasons of public policy, the 
fact that the impugned benefit appears inconsistent with the maintenance 
of the ‘trusting’ relationship between the parties has been seen as reason 
enough to call on D to show free and informed consent, and to divest D of 
the impugned benefit if she or he is unable to do so. The jurisdiction can 
thus be seen to possess a distinctive prophylactic element, expressed 
primarily through the way in which the so-called ‘presumption’ of undue 
influence has traditionally operated in such cases. To be sure, as soon as 
the right combination of circumstances (ie, ‘risk’) is found to exist — 
opportunity (ie, fiduciary influence), incentive (ie, the impugned benefit), 
and epistemological uncertainty (ie, serious detection and evidentiary 
problems) — equity indulges in a presumption that self-interest and 
temptation have operated in the particular case — that what was feared has 
materialized (or at least that it may well have done so). It then calls upon 
the benefiting party to satisfy the court otherwise. 
The classic case that we taught along these lines is the 1936 decision of 
the High Court in Johnson v Buttress.71 There, at least according to four of 
                                                          
69  See, generally, R Flannigan, ‘Presumed Undue Influence: The False Partition from Fiduciary 
Accountability’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 171; Johnson v Buttress 
(1936) 56 CLR 113, especially 123 (Latham CJ), 134–5 (Dixon J; Evatt J agreeing); 143 
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 the five members of the bench in that case, the challenged inter vivos 
conveyance was set aside not because the claimant (the deceased donor’s 
executor) could establish Class 2 undue influence as an affirmative 
conclusion on the evidence before the court, but rather because the donee 
could not satisfy the court that undue influence had not occurred in the 
context of an ‘antecedent relation of influence’ that could be shown to have 
existed between the parties to the impugned transaction. As Latham CJ put 
it in his judgment, ‘the transaction … [could not] stand by reason of the 
general policy of the law directed to preventing the possible abuse of 
relations of trust and confidence’.72 
Turning to the equitable (and parallel statutory73) jurisdiction to relieve 
against ‘unconscionable conduct’ (or an ‘unconscionable dealing’), here 
we find that the parties were, ex ante entry into the impugned transaction, 
and in contrast to Class 2 undue influence situations, at arm’s length; 
however, they were not, for some reason inherent in P, or because of the 
particular circumstances in which P happened to find him- or herself 
relative to D, not on an equal footing. Here, typically, D as the ascendant 
party ‘exercises power’ over P not by creating a problem with P’s 
autonomy as such (like in misrepresentation or duress cases, for example), 
but rather by working with or knowingly taking advantage of a disabling 
condition or circumstance that D found, at least to some extent, ‘ready-
made’ in P, which condition or circumstance rendered P vulnerable to 
merely instrumental utilization at the hands of D. There are, of course, 
cases such as Louth v Diprose74 where D can be found to have actively 
manipulated P’s ‘special disadvantage’ (ie, P’s serious inability ‘to make a 
judgment as to his own best interests’ 75  in relation to the proposed 
transaction), but the minimal sufficient condition and conceptual core of 
unconscionable dealing as a form of human behaviour is simply that D, as 
a rational agent, chose not to respond to the subjectively known substantial 
possibility that P was, by reason of his or her ‘special disadvantage’, unable 
to act fully legally autonomously relative to D in the proposed transaction 
inter se. The paradigmatic case of unconscionable dealing, then, simply 
involves D transacting with P without sufficient regard for P’s autonomy 
interests in the transaction subsequently called into question, Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (‘Amadio’) 76  being a representative 
example of such behaviour. P is, in this sense, subjected to an improper 
reason for intentional action essentially through D’s omissive conduct — 
through D’s operative failure adequately to administer to P’s disabling 
condition or circumstance before taking a benefit from P (eg, by ensuring 
the receipt of competent advice for P, or by fully disclosing or explaining 
the transactional risks to P, or by correcting known erroneous assumptions 
in relation to the proposed transaction, or, perhaps, in jurisdictions beyond 
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76  (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
 New Zealand and Australia, by ensuring that P receives commensurate 
value in return for whatever moved from P as consideration in the exchange 
relationship). 
In contrast to misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, then, it 
seems that unconscionable dealing is incapable of occurring ‘innocently’, 
or even ‘negligently’; it depends on proof of nothing short of naked 
exploitation: that D’s decision not to respond to P’s known special 
disadvantage was deliberate in the manner demanded by an exploitation 
claim77 (although this would seem to belie the successful invocation of the 
doctrine in Amadio itself). 
V  A ‘Thorne’ in the Side of Our Subject Design? 
No sooner had we finished teaching the law relating to contract vitiation in 
the manner described above than the High Court delivered its decision in 
Thorne, mentioned earlier. One of the effects of that decision (according, 
at least, to the majority of the judges in the case) was immediately to render 
descriptively inaccurate at least part the account of the law that we had just 
presented to our students, namely, that the major exculpatory doctrines of 
contract law — though especially misleading conduct, duress, undue 
influence and unconscionable dealing — are best understood in terms of 
the distinct behavioural phenomena that attract each doctrine and which 
explain their continued practical and intellectual separation. For not only is 
undue influence presented in Thorne as a single concept not having 
different ‘forms’ or expressing different principles across the traditional 
classes of case administered by the doctrine (the ‘presumption’ of undue 
influence, consequently, being explained as a garden-variety ‘standardized 
inference’ rather than a policy-inspired procedural rule directed to 
‘prophylaxis’ rather than genuine proof), it is also rationalized very 
differently from its equitable sibling, unconscionable dealing, despite both 
doctrines continuing to be described as ‘closely related’.78 According to the 
majority of the judges in that case, undue influence is an exculpatory reason 
that responds to the claimant’s serious inability to act as a ‘free agent’ when 
assenting to an impugned transaction, whereas unconscionable dealing is 
rationalized, as the High Court has confirmed on many previous occasions, 
as a defendant-sided, wrongful-conduct-based ground of relief.79 Moreover, 
the liberal references by all of their Honours in Thorne to writings from the 
‘restitution’ or ‘autonomous unjust enrichment’ branch of the legal 
academy,80 including the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
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 Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,81 leaves us wondering whether 
other exculpatory categories, such as duress, mistake and innocent 
misrepresentation, might eventually encounter the same fate. Were that to 
happen on a grand scale, then it would certainly be arguable that the subject 
matter of ‘contract vitiation’ belongs not to ‘contract law’ at all, but rather 
to some standalone legal department designed to house all of the various 
reasons where the law might respond in the manner of disgorgement of an 
unjust gain. 
That speculation aside, we presently find ourselves, in the wake of 
Thorne, perplexed and unable to explain to our students why, exactly, such 
a disjunctive rationalization between undue influence and unconscionable 
dealing is, or ought to be, a plausible version of the law in this area in this 
country. Certainly, the relevant judges in Thorne do not supply a credible 
reason for the differential treatment to which we can refer our learners; and 
as matters now stand, undue influence is rationalized very differently from 
prior formulations of the jurisdiction in Australia, including by the High 
Court itself (of which more shortly), not to mention current articulations 
by senior courts and judicial committees abroad. 82  Still, Gordon J in 
Thorne even went so far as to state that it ‘may now be taken to be accepted 
in Australia’ that the two doctrines are separated by reason of the different 
foci of their respective inquiries,83 citing in support of that proposition a 
nineteenth-century English case, Tate v Williamson,84 and a 1995 article 
by unjust enrichment scholars Birks and Chin,85 who in turn relied (in part) 
on obiter dicta of two former members of the High Court, Mason J and 
Deane J, in Amadio in 1983. The relevant passages from their Honours’ 
judgments, respectively, are these: 
[Under the doctrine of undue influence] … the will of the innocent party is not 
independent and voluntary because it is overborne. [Under the doctrine of 
unconscionable dealing] … the will of the innocent party, even if independent 
and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he is 
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 placed and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that 
position.86 
Undue influence … looks to the quality of the consent or assent of the weaker 
party … Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger party in 
attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, a dealing with a person under a 
special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good 
conscience that he should do so.87 
Does Tate v Williamson, and the above-quoted dicta, provide credible 
precedential support for the divergent rationalizations of undue influence 
and unconscionable dealing endorsed by both the plurality and Gordon J in 
Thorne? Indeed, one of the seminar exercises that we set for students in our 
Principles of Contractual Liability course before Thorne was decided was 
to ask them to ‘critically discuss’ the above-quoted dicta from Mason J’s 
and Deane J’s judgments in Amadio. The hope, of course, was that our 
students would, in the light of the case law we had been considering to that 
point in the course, see that the distinction drawn, if it is to be capable of 
withstanding analysis, is in need of much greater exposition than their 
Honours offered in that case. In fact, the Amadio dicta are endorsed in 
Thorne quite without reflection or dissective analysis, including of the 
antecedent authorities upon which the propounded distinction purports to 
rely. In that regard, the precedential foundations of Mason J’s and Deane 
J’s dicta are, with respect, less than compelling. First, Mason J cited no 
authority at all for the contrast that he drew in the first passage quoted 
above; it is simply asserted. Deane J, however, did enlist authorities in 
support of a consent-focused conception of undue influence: Union Bank 
of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw,88 Watkins v Combes89 and Morrison v Coast 
Finance Ltd. 90  But even a cursory survey of those authorities at the 
pinpoints provided by his Honour discloses a rather different 
notionalization of undue influence than the subject dicta would suggest. To 
be sure, in Whitelaw, at the page referenced by Deane J, Hodge J defines 
‘undue influence’ as ‘the improper use by the ascendant person of such 
ascendancy for the benefit of himself or someone else, so that the acts of 
the person influenced are not, in the fullest sense of the word, his free 
voluntary acts’.91 And in Watkins, at the pages referenced, Isaacs J mainly 
quotes from Lord Shaw in Poosathurai v Kannappa Chettiar,92 but nothing 
that Lord Shaw said in that case seems to reinforce the distinction that 
Deane J advances in Amadio; on the contrary, his Lordship there speaks of 
it having to ‘be established that the person in a position of domination has 
used that position to obtain unfair advantage for himself, and so to cause 
injury to the person relying upon his authority or aid’, and that a burden of 
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 proof is cast upon the ascendant party to show ‘that no domination was 
practised so as to bring about the transaction’.93 These, we respectfully 
suggest, are not the locutions of a purely consent-focused conception of 
undue influence. Granted, the third case that Deane J cited in his dicta in 
Amadio — Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd — does support the distinction 
drawn; but there Davey JA, at the page referenced, merely asserts the 
contrast between ‘undue influence’ and ‘unconscionable bargain’ as an 
unsubstantiated and undeveloped obiter remark, and even in Canada it has 
been acknowledged in the academic literature that ‘there is little evidence 
in the decided cases to support it’.94 
As for Gordon J’s reliance on Tate v Williamson as evidence in support 
of the acceptance of a plaintiff-sided conception of undue influence in 
Australia, this too seems problematic. Not only is Tate not a domestic 
authority, it is also a classic ‘fiduciary’ case (as was the English law of 
undue influence at that time). With respect, this makes it difficult to see 
how what was said in Tate could possibly sustain a purely consent-oriented 
account of the equitable jurisdiction as expounded in Thorne. As Lord 
Chelmsford LC famously stated in Tate (on the page referenced by Gordon 
J in Thorne): 
The jurisdiction exercised by Courts of equity over the dealings of persons 
standing in certain fiduciary relations has always been regarded as one of a 
most salutary description. The principles applicable to the more familiar 
relations of this character have been long settled by many well-known decisions, 
but the Courts have always been careful not to fetter this useful jurisdiction by 
defining the exact limits of its exercise. Wherever two persons stand in such a 
relation that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and 
the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the 
other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an 
advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself 
of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although the 
transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation had 
existed.95 
This is, of course, of a piece with the account of Class 2, ‘relational’ 
undue influence presented and applied by the majority of their Honours of 
the High Court in Johnson v Buttress, which, arguably, contained the 
leading pronouncements on the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against an 
executory or concluded transaction on the ground of ‘undue influence’ as 
it was expounded in this country immediately prior to Thorne. And yet for 
some reason not disclosed in Thorne itself, the policy-driven approach of 
the majority of the judges to undue influence in Johnson, directed (in 
Lathan CJ’s words) ‘to preventing the possible abuse of relations of trust 
                                                          
93  Emphasis added. 
94  Robert W Clark, Inequality of Bargaining Power: Judicial Intervention in Improvident and 
Unconscionable Bargains (Carswell, 1987) 110. Still, the distinction was repeated (more or 
less) by La Forest J (obiter) in Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377, 406: ‘undue influence 
focuses on the sufficiency of consent and unconscionability looks at the reasonableness of a 
given transaction’. 
95  (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55, 61 (emphasis added). 
 and confidence’,96  is simply bypassed without mention. We sense that 
Thorne represents a departure from Johnson without purporting to be an 
overruling; on the contrary, throughout the judgments of both the plurality 
and Gordon J in Thorne, lip serve is paid to Johnson as if the current 
description of the law continues to be based on that earlier precedent. 
However, that Dixon J (Evatt J agreeing) in Johnson described the basis of 
the equitable jurisdiction to be ‘the prevention of an unconscientious use 
of any special capacity or opportunity that may exist or arise of affecting 
the alienor’s will or freedom of judgment in reference to such a matter’97 
seems rather discordant with an account of undue influence that 
emphasizes only the quality of the ‘will’ or the freedom of the ‘agency’ 
brought to the impugned transaction by the claimant, as the majority of the 
judges do in Thorne. 
Also bypassed without specific mention in Thorne are the dicta of other 
members of the High Court on previous occasions (not to mention of senior 
courts overseas98) that belie the dicta of Mason J and Deane J in Amadio; 
and yet, Mason J’s and Deane J’s dicta seem to prevail in Thorne despite 
their precedential frailty. For example, in Louth v Diprose,99 Brennan J, 
after quoting the relevant passage from Deane J’s judgment in Amadio 
(above), stated that ‘[a]lthough the two jurisdictions are distinct, they both 
depend upon the effect of influence (presumed or actual) improperly 
brought to bear by one party to a relationship on the mind of the other 
whereby the other disposes of his property’, and that ‘[g]ifts obtained by 
unconscionable conduct and gifts obtained by undue influence are set aside 
by equity on substantially the same basis.’100 And in Tanwar Enterprises 
Pty Ltd v Cauchi,101 Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon 
JJ described the ‘governing equitable principle’ that unites cases of both 
‘alleged undue influence and catching bargains’ as one that is ‘concerned 
with the production by malign means of an intention to act’102 (although 
this may well overstate the level culpability actually required on the part of 
an undue influencer, as transaction-avoiding undue influence may be well-
intentioned in fact). 
Finally, if the Thorne majority is right about the plaintiff-sided 
personality of undue influence, then why does such a rationalization not 
also follow for unconscionable dealing (except, of course, that the High 
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 Court has been portraying that exculpatory doctrine as conduct-centred for 
decades)? At one point in the plurality’s judgment in Thorne 103  their 
Honours suggest that a party who is subject to ‘undue influence’ (in the 
consent-oriented way perceived by their Honours) is also, for that reason, 
in a position of ‘special disadvantage’ for the purposes of the separate 
unconscionable dealing jurisdiction (the complaint under that jurisdiction 
only being realized if an act of exploitation should actually follow upon the 
non-disadvantaged party becoming sufficiently aware of the opportunity 
(for interpersonal exploitation) that his or her special position of advantage 
afforded). But if ‘undue influence’ is sufficient to constitute ‘special 
disadvantage’, and thus to vitiate a transaction, why does it not follow that 
proof of ‘special disadvantage’ also suffices to vitiate a transaction? Since 
‘special disadvantage’ is itself defined by reference of a legal threshold of 
serious impairment of personal autonomy — that ‘the disabling condition 
or circumstance is one which seriously affects the ability of the innocent 
party to make a judgment as to his own best interests’104 — then why does 
it not logically follow that special disadvantage should, like consent 
impaired by reason of undue influence, equally suffice to warrant 
correction of a transaction that can be shown to have resulted from the mere 
existence of an autonomy-impairing special condition or circumstance? 
Perhaps reasons are available in answer to these questions, although 
none are supplied in Thorne itself. It is true that unlike cases in which 
unconscionable dealing is established, relief may be granted in ‘Class 2’ 
undue influence cases without any direct proof of unconscientious use. But 
it is important to pay attention to the rationale for dispensing with a 
requirement of direct proof. The historical basis of relief in Class 2 undue 
influence cases, as we have already argued, is a generic policy-based 
presumption that the influence of the ascendant party has been abused or 
misused: Class 2 undue influence actually regulates against the mere risk 
of a morally objectionable conduct and not the materialization of morally 
objectionable conduct itself. Moreover, if undue influence cannot be 
explained by reference to an unconscientious use of an advantageous 
bargaining position (or ‘abuse of a dominant position’, as it is sometimes 
expressed) 105 , then why can unconscionable dealing not also be re-
explained simply in terms of a ‘non-voluntary transfer of value’ warranting 
reversal on basic restitutionary or ‘autonomous unjust enrichment’-style 
principles (as some within that school have been inclined to argue)?106 For 
ourselves, from the standpoint of the liberal conception of contract at least, 
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 and the intellectual and institutional forms of order that that conception 
presupposes, it is difficult to see how recognizing as ‘exculpatory’ mere 
states of affairs like ‘excessive dependence’, ‘markedly sub-standard 
judgmental capacity’, or ‘undue influence’ (Thorne-style) avoids ultimate 
collapse into a Denning-esque doctrine of ‘inequality of bargaining power’ 
and, ultimately, an instrument of distributive justice. We do not deny that 
inequality of bargaining power is a legitimate concern; interference with 
transactions for that reason may well be a legitimate option available to 
parliaments in the enactment of consumer protection legislation (say). We 
doubt, however, that it would be an appropriate standalone doctrine for Her 
Majesty’s judicial officers to adopt, regardless of their seniority, in the 
administration and development of the unwritten law of Australia. 
VI  Conclusion: The Way Forward? 
One of the key responsibilities of a law teacher is to create opportunities 
for his or her learners to effectively organize and apply conceptual 
knowledge within the particular legal area under study. The immediate 
challenge posed by the High Court’s recent decision in Thorne to the 
authors’ prior attempt, for teaching purposes, to arrange and present the 
exculpatory doctrines of (or relating to) contract law is whether that attempt 
should now be abandoned or modified in the light of what was said in that 
case about significant ‘vitiating factors’ of common law and equity. It is 
not, of course, possible simply to ignore the decision, no matter how much 
one may find aspects of it to be precedentially deficient and unhelpful to 
the orderly development of the law. The highest court in the land has 
spoken, and the law of undue influence (especially) in Australia is now as 
it is described in the relevant judgments in Thorne, which must be 
respected. Students must, therefore, be made aware of the decision. 
But the fact remains that many aspects of the majority judgments in 
Thorne are difficult to comprehend and to accept, for both teacher and 
learner alike. In particular, unless the disjunctive rationalizations of undue 
influence and unconscionable dealing necessitated by those judgments can 
be adequately explained and supported by credible reasons, the law in this 
area now presents, as least to our minds, as unprincipled. Also, given that 
Johnson v Buttress was not overruled in Thorne, it is, at least on our reading 
of the respective authorities, impossible to reconcile, in a credible manner, 
the later articulations of the law relating to undue influence in Thorne with 
the earlier exposition of the equitable jurisdiction by the majority of the 
members of the High Court in Johnson. And so, rather than attempting the 
impossible, and potentially abandoning (or significantly modifying) the 
prior design decisions made in our Principles of Contractual Liability 
course, our approach going forward will be to use the Thorne decision as 
what educationalists sometimes call a ‘teachable moment’ 107  — an 
opportunity in the natural development of the law student toward 
attainment of the capacity to evaluate the validity of ideas, or to make 
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 rational and informed value judgements based on internal evidence and 
external criteria, and to demonstrate as much in classroom interaction and 
assessment tasks.108 Our role, particularly as students begin to mature in 
their ability to manage their own learning, is to present the law as it is and 
to assist the learner not only to make sense of what has been presented to 
him or her in classroom discussions and accompanying readings, but to 
also hold an educated view about the state of law as he or she finds it. This 
is not, of course, to say that our students must agree with our personal 
assessments of the law when they are proffered (as they sometimes are) — 
the aim here is to teach law students how to think, not what to think — but 
likewise they should begin to become comfortable with the idea that not 
even the highest court in the land is beyond their respectful critical 
reflections. 
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